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Abstract: This study seeks to support an interdisciplinary, theory-practice 
integrated work on the applied ethics of information and communication 
technologies (ICT). Current work on applied ICT ethics is of a disciplinary 
nature and seeks to apply traditional philosophical norms to novel situations that 
are not easily identified by analogy to previous cases. I propose an alternative 
view in which ICTs are seen as a moral environment and ethical agents are seen 
as human-computer hybrids (cyborgs) whose experiences acquire ethical value 
ecologically. To implement such a view, I propose employing two different kinds 
of semiotics: a semiotics of meaning-making that is open to the environmental 
effects of cyborg acts across scales, and a material semiotics that allows for 
interdisciplinary practitioners to recognize the modes of existence involved 
in the ethical issues and work out better means-ends relationships among the 
modes pertinent to each discipline.
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Resumo: Esta pesquisa busca apoiar um trabalho interdisciplinar que 
integre teoria e prática acerca de uma ética aplicada das tecnologias digitais 
da informação e comunicação. O trabalho atual em ética aplicada das TIC 
é de natureza disciplinar e busca aplicar normas filosóficas tradicionais às 
novas situações as quais não são facilmente identificadas por analogia a casos 
anteriores. Eu proponho uma visão alternativa pela qual as TIC são vistas 
como um ambiente ético e os agentes éticos são vistos como híbridos humano-
computador (ciborgues) cujas experiências adquirem valor ético ecologicamente. 
Para implementar esta visão,  proponho que se empregue dois tipos distintos de 
semiótica: uma semiótica da significação que esteja aberta aos efeitos ambientais 
das atividades dos ciborgues em diferentes escalas, e uma semiótica material 
que permita aos praticantes de diferentes disciplinas reconhecerem os modos 
de existência envolvidos nas questões éticas e buscarem melhores relações do 
tipo meio-fim entre os modos implicados por cada disciplina.
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0 A prologue on ambiguity and incompleteness
This paper presents the initial results of a research project aimed at 
achieving a metadiscursive/metatheoretical reasoning framework for an 
applied ethics of ICTs viewed as postsocial/post-human ethics of the here 
and now. These are philosophical and analytical-methodological perspectives 
that have a longstanding tradition, however short, in the digital humanities 
and social sciences, which most readers are probably already aware of to 
some degree. While pointing the readers to the works of Katherine Hayles 
(1999, 2011) and Karen Knorr-Cetina (1997, 2001, 2005) for a panoramic 
introduction to those traditions, I would like these terms, as used here, to 
refer to the definitions that follow.
“Postsocial” is a sociological perspective that emphasizes object 
relations as well as subject relations in explanations of social behavior. It 
recognizes that epistemic objects (especially computers and computer-
like devices) are increasingly replacing human peers as both social context 
and/or activity partners in everyday life. This has become possible because 
computers, as all epistemic objects, unfold in reciprocity with human desires 
and needs. 
“Posthuman” refers to a critical, deconstructivist account of the 
illuminist notion of human nature and the liberal conceptualization of the 
social subject. As a body of heterogeneous literary, philosophical, and techno-
scientific discourse, posthumanism challenges our received notions of body, 
intelligence, mind, soul, subjectivity, and consciousness by emphasizing 
human co-evolution with artifacts, the human physical, cognitive, and 
affective co-dependence on prostheses, media, and other biological species. 
There are politically benign and malign versions of posthumanist critique, 
imagination, and techno-scientific entrepreneurship, some of which are 
deemed anti-human and others transhuman, i.e., wishing to eliminate all 
human predicaments through technology so that humans manage their 
evolutionary trajectory in order to become immortal.
Pursuing a metatheoretical/metadiscursive framework for an applied 
ethics of the ICTs viewed as postsocial/posthuman ethics of the here and now 
is obviously a monumental task that I by no means intend to suggest can be 
handled by one researcher in one paper. Yet, like many colleagues in other 
fields, I would like to propose this necessary and urgent discussion to my own 
community, so that it finds some possible points of intersection with other 
fields in a holistic, organic, distributed, and networked endeavor of this kind. 
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Obviously, this kind of endeavor is poorly served by monomodality, 
print technology, and traditional academic genres. Therefore, this paper is 
flagrantly overreaching, if not politically naïve, since it deals with vast and 
complex literature, of which the depth cannot be fairly accounted for in 
only a few pages. In particular, I will draw upon the work of two specific 
authors, Bruno Latour and Jay Lemke, whose oeuvres are fairly well known 
by Brazilian applied linguists, but are also too complex and far-ranging to be 
summarized in one section of one academic paper. I will, thus, depend on the 
generosity of the readers to tolerate a certain vagueness in my proposal, and 
their willingness to follow my pointers to pertinent introductory literature, if 
necessary. On the other hand, I will also depend on the indulgence of readers 
from academic fields other than applied linguistics that are implicated in my 
argument to forgive the shallowness with which I had to introduce concepts 
and ideas from those fields here.
In sum, I wish this paper to be thought of as overreaching but not 
pretentious, far-fetched but not romantic, and as an invitation to learn 
together about what we are becoming, hopefully with colleagues from many 
other fields.  Should this message in a bottle meet a like-minded readership, 
I am sure a next step would be to develop more flexible, multimodal, 
crossmedia forms of discursive activity, as well as instruments of evaluation 
and scientific accountability. Above all, we must find different ways to bring 
ordinary people and ordinary language into these discussions, given that it 
is in the lived trajectories of everyday lives that the ethical dimension of a 
global human-computer ecology becomes politically relevant. 
In the first section, I present an anecdote about an interdisciplinary 
project aimed at improving e-government interfaces with the purpose of 
illustrating the need for a new kind of interdisciplinary endeavor which 
embraces ethical work involving ICTs. I propose that, upon creating new 
mediations to help adapt users to the ways things work in ICTs, we are in 
fact creating cyborgs and are therefore dealing with a posthuman ethics of 
the here and now. It is my belief that we need to develop an appropriate 
metadiscursive/metatheoretical framework to accomplish this goal.
In trying to approach this discussion to applied linguistics, I dedicate 
the second section to review the basics of moral philosophy and metaethics, 
the latter being understood as an attempt to extract a language of morals 
from moral language. I defend that an applied ICT ethics based on this 
strategy is ineffective, as one cannot merely pre-load the ethical value of 
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human-computer experiential trajectories from logical relations and must 
instead rely on the experiential trajectory of cyborg agents.
In the third section, I present a state-of-the-art  of the current 
discussions in applied ICT ethics led by professionals of the computer and 
information sciences. I show that the mainstream in these discussions recurs 
within a great variety of ethical theories and metaethical positions in the face 
of uncertainties caused by the integration of computers within a wide range 
of social practices. However, an alternative view begins to gain importance in 
the field which advocates a phenomenological approach by which the ethical 
value of the act is disclosed in an archeology of the human and non-human 
agencies involved.
In the fourth section, I propose that two theories could be brought 
together in order to support a kind of ethical reasoning concerning the 
new ethical issues that become apparent when we view ICTs as an ethical 
environment and consider the ethical meaning of acts as constructed in the 
cyborgian experience. I suggest Jay Lemke`s ecosocial semiotics could be used 
to study the real-life, environmental effects of the material-semiotic processes 
carried out by cyborg agents in different scales. Moreover, Bruno Latour’s 
material semiotics can be used as a reflexive device for interdisciplinary 
teams to become aware of the ethical implications of translating entities into 
different modes of existence and to figure out ways to protect these ethical 
dimensions in the users’ thread of experience.
In the final section I pose some ethical questions that this approach 
might help generate in relation to the anecdote offered in section one as 
an illustration of the kind of reasoning and research that could possibly be 
derived from the overall argument.
1 Introduction: from why to how language matters
“Why does language matter here?” is what an applied linguist often 
asks when trying to engage with a new research object. But when “here” is 
the ethical environment comprised of current human-computer activity, 
defined herein as ICTs, I argue “how does language matter?” is a question we 
also must ask. I will use the verb “to matter” in both its figurative and literal 
senses in this paper, even though a literal sense of “to matter” is not in the 
dictionary. I do so because, in the living trajectory of this language, nouns 
can sometimes also be verbs. Hence, the reader’s languaging (SWAIN, 1985) 
mind may not mind such ambiguity. 
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As a matter of fact, ambiguity is a central notion in this work, as is the 
notion of an ethical environment. Blackburn (2002, p. 1) defines an ethical 
environment as: 
the surrounding climate of ideas about how to live [which] determines 
what we find acceptable or unacceptable, admirable or contemptible […] 
our conception of when things are going well and when they are going 
badly [and] our conception of what is due to us, and what is due from 
us as we relate to others. 
The ambiguity I refer to here becomes apparent when we understand 
that ICTs are not only an infrastructure that is physically contained in the 
same material substrate where sentient beings act and are acted upon, but 
they are also a series of dynamic material-semiotic processes that affect 
our perception and understanding of what is “out there” beyond our 
physical presence. Therefore, just as speakers pursuing meaning engage in 
languaging (THIBAULT, 2011), networked computers-plus-users engage 
in “mattering”; they materialize something in the world.
In other words, as we use ICTs to translate what some of us believe is 
an essentially computational world into signs, we engage in material relations 
that affect the sensitive world in ways that require new readings, and those, 
in turn, may well be further translated through computations, and so on 
and so forth. In other words, in pursuing a definition of what is, humans 
and computers together are also defining what ought to be and vice-versa. 
Let me illustrate with an anecdote.
About a decade ago I participated in the initial phase of a supposedly 
interdisciplinary research project on e-government interfaces. I say 
“supposedly”, because it worked more like a hierarchical multidisciplinary 
job in which the applied linguists, the language people in the project, were 
assigned a task previously defined by the engineers and system analysts, the 
computer people: to rewrite the contents of certain e-government interfaces 
using a lexicon and a phraseology that “everyone would understand.” 
The design philosophy that guided the project was Universal Design 
(henceforth UD) (Story et al., 1998). UD started as an epistemic response 
to the disability rights movement (Shaw, 2008) in the US. Out of a politics 
of access, it turned universality into a moral value. Providing concrete means 
of achievement towards universality is the UD practitioner’s ethical task. But 
one might want to ask: is universality a means or an end? 
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In the case at hand, the computer people modeled functionally 
illiterate users in cognitive ergonometric terms, which rendered them 
“disabled”, as measured through their performance of a given task in much 
the same sense as vision, motion, or hearing impaired users are measured, as 
odd as it may seem. This “mattering” of the illiterate struck a very dissonant 
note with the language people, of course, especially because they leaned 
towards the ideological model of literacy (STREET, 1984) rather than the 
radically functional approach implicit in the computer people’s rhetoric. This, 
in turn, led the language people to present a plethora of academic evidence 
to support their vision of what language and literacy are all about, which was 
followed by a rejoinder from the computer people about the need for a single 
norm for any communication process to be efficient, and, eventually, to silence 
on both sides until a political commitment could be made. 
Basically, in order to bridge the epistemic-ontological gap between these 
views and materialize something that both groups could accept, the language 
people decided to invite colleagues who specialized in corpus linguistics to 
join the discussion, and those colleagues managed to extract the most frequent 
(rather than simplest) lexical items and phrases from a database of oral histories 
recorded by real people whose biographical records matched the ontological 
requirements of an average agreed upon persona, a  vector comprised of logical/
numerical properties rather than any embodied citizen in particular. 
In attempting an interdisciplinary applied ethics of utilitarian nature, 
the team configured an ingenuous ethical mediation: the language people 
would facilitate the interface (the end) to help the computer people make 
effective users (the means); the computer people would make the state 
bureaucracy more effective (the end) by facilitating the citizens to be (the 
means). Together, they were planning to release cyborg citizens1 (GRAY, 
1 I use the term cyborg in this essay in accordance with Gray’s (2000, p.2) definition, i.e., 
“a cyborg is a self-regulating organism that combines the natural and artificial together 
in one system. Cyborgs do not have to be part human, for any organism/system that 
mixes the evolved and the made, the living and the inanimate, is technically a cyborg.” 
Likewise, I borrow the notion of cyborg citizen from Gray (2000, p. 20-32) for whom 
a cyborg citizen is an embodied being (whether such body is organism, machine, or 
both) who can competently participate in the Polis as a discourse community. I realize, 
and so does Gray, that this conceptualization is problematic and requires further 
discussion and investigation, but it suffices for my purposes here as long as my reader, 
like Gray’s, agrees to treat it as a “working idea”, not a universal, naturalized concept.
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2000) in the world. 
As Latour (1994) has famously argued in relation to the traditional 
debate about gun control in the US, when a cyborg, such as a human-plus-
fire-arm, acts ethically, either as a slayer or as a law enforcer, neither the 
artifact nor the human user can be taken, by itself, as the ethical agent. The 
agent is a third being created by the association of human and artefactual 
agencies. The ethical agency is hardly predictable if either agency is 
considered alone. Each agency passes through the other in order to sustain 
itself and, in doing so, somehow is deviated. That is how cold-blooded 
murder, manslaughter, or self-defense killing come into the world, three very 
distinct kinds of ethical worth for the exact same formal-actional coupling. 
As more and more human-computer cyborg agencies make ambiguous 
meanings in lived trajectories in the sensitive world, new ethical issues 
become available to which previous moral norms apply inefficiently 
(MOORE, 2004). To claim that we are improving this new ethical 
environment, we must work towards a new politics of sentience; we need to 
study the new ways in which we can hurt or be hurt by the other, as well as 
what is due to and from us as cyborg citizens on a planetary scale.  
Computers, like fire arms, have no feelings and no intentionality, and 
they do not define their goals in the sensitive world. But they can internally 
generate what will later become ethical decisions, through translations 
between moral trust and epistemic trust (BUECHNER, 2013), since 
both are amenable to normativity. In other words, because computers are 
normative machines that rule over what can exist for themselves, they often 
become ethical agents who rule over what humans and non-human agents 
must or must not do through them. In doing so, computers become part 
of the Polis, and their internal politics must conform to that of the citizens. 
This is what makes human-computer cyborg ethical agencies so hard 
to grasp politically:  they are doubly ambiguous agents: not only do they 
transport agency about, but they also act in disputed aboutness. Human 
constructors, users, and cybernetic machines (including software) acting 
together as cyborgs will inevitably experience the Polis and act ethically 
in partial transparency and partial withdrawal (IHDE, 2011). My GPS 
application might help me take someone to the hospital faster by showing 
me a short-cut I did not know existed, but the short-cut can be a crime-
ridden alley where I am going to get caught in a shootout. The constructor 
may include the information about shoot-outs and crime rates in the GPS 
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application, but that would probably jeopardize the chances of honest people 
living in the area getting a job because of their ZIP code.  For every way in 
which computerized systems augment human awareness and sensitivity, 
some part of their sentience and sensibility is also affected by the computers’ 
inability to be truly aware of human pain or pleasure.
Therefore, the main argument I wish to put forward here is that 
if researchers from the humanities and the so-called hard sciences and 
engineering wish to engage democratically and effectively with an applied 
ICT ethics, they will need to work together on a new kind of interdisciplinary 
reflexive metatheoretical and metadiscursive framework that embraces the 
ambiguities of being-doing and meaning-feeling. A good starting point, I 
suggest, would be to view moral philosophy and metaethics more precisely 
in order to find out what they can and cannot offer in this case. 
2 Moral philosophy, metaethics, and the bridging of the is-ou-
ght to gap
Moral philosophy is concerned with how we ought to act in order 
to live a good, happy life.  Metaethics discusses the limits and properties 
of moral philosophical theories and of morality itself.  Applied ethics seeks 
the best ways to apply ethics theories to professional practices or domains 
of human activity. Its product is a renewable body of policies and good 
practices. Together, these three inter-related fields have more to do with 
language than is often noticed by applied linguists.  I will limit myself to 
the four main ethics theories: virtue ethics, intentionalism, normativism 
(deontology), and consequentialism (utilitarianism). Next, I will make a 
brief incursion in metaethics. 
For Aristotle, ethics guides humans to the source of their well-being 
(eudaimonia), which is, ultimately, living in accordance with their own 
pre-assigned nature. To achieve this, one needs access to material resources 
of certain kinds, which depends on chance, and needs to develop virtue, 
emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, 
expectations, and sensibilities, which can be cultivated (KRAUT, 2014) 
and turn into “a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor” 
(HURSTHOUSE, 2013, Item 2). Reason alone will not suffice to define 
the ethical worth of one’s acts, in this case, owing to the fact that the 
material conditions one faces are always uncertain. The ethical act requires 
phronesis, i.e. the “sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgment 
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informed by experience [...] needed to apply rules or principles correctly” 
(HURSTHOUSE , 2013, Item 3). 
Intentionalism (KING, 1995), a second landmark, starts with the 
Augustinian concept of sin by intention and gains momentum with Peter 
Abelard (1079 - 1142), who argued that all humans bare both good and evil 
traits or dispositions; hence, it is the intention behind one’s act that defines 
one’s moral worth.  The dismissal by the sarcastic Christian aphorism “the 
road to hell is paved with good intentions” notwithstanding, intentionalism 
emphasizes the epistemic status of the agent as a definer of her moral agency. 
Deontological ethics (ALEXANDER; MOORE, 2015), best 
represented by Kantian moral philosophy, deems actions good or evil by 
reference to norms that appeal to human reason through a logic of means 
and ends. Certain means can be deemed unequivocally good, and thus 
become ends in themselves or categorical imperatives. The ethical worth of 
any new act can be determined through an analogy to a previous situation 
according to such imperatives or universal prescriptions. The ultimate source 
of Kantian categorical imperatives is metaphysical, or God, and need not be 
proven, as God is goodness by definition. 
Utilitarianism (consequentialism), the theory of choice in the modern 
liberal West and for most computer applied ethicists, argues that categorical 
imperatives conflict among themselves in practice when one takes the concrete 
consequences of actions into account. It is pleasure/happiness (good) and 
pain/fear (evil) as consequences (ends) that should describe the moral worth 
of an action (means). Here, the epistemic component that Abelard attached to 
agency is transferred to causality, so that goodness and evil can be safely arrived 
at by calculation: “It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the 
measure of right and wrong” (Bentham, 1988, p.393).  
As can be seen, if virtue and intention are taken out of the picture, 
as is the case in objective reasoning that befits computer matters, the main 
line of tension is that between those who defend a normative/prescriptive 
foundation for ethics and those who defend an epistemic/descriptive one. 
This split goes back to David Hume’s (1639, p. 335, my emphasis) 
famous is-ought to problem, which he first described in these words:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with [...] the 
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, 
and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead 
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of the usual copulations of propositions, ‘is’, and ‘is not’, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ‘ought’, or an ‘ought not’. This 
change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as 
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation (...).
Hume’s guillotine can be understood primarily as part of the author’s 
more general critique of causation, in this case, denouncing a lack of causation 
between what is (metaphysics) and what ought to be (ethics), which would 
later become an argument against religious and deontological morality. 
However, as Brandt (1963) points out, Hume’s exercise of seeking relations 
between moral language and languages of morals (ethical theories) is at the 
heart of metaethics as a whole. It is virtually impossible to do justice to the 
whole of metaethics here, so I must limit myself to the most essential elements 
to defend my argument, and use Figure 1, along with the bibliographical 
pointers in its caption, to help the reader gain a more overall perspective.
Brandt’s (1963) emphasis on moral language helps us understand why 
metaethics has so many divergent positions: we can express obligation in 
natural language in many ways, some of which are explicitly normative (e.g., 
imperative moods and modal verbs), while others are not (e.g., illocutionary 
acts and figurative language). Apart from that, if ethics is a matter of fact, 
we should be able to talk about moral statements in terms of truth-apt 
propositions (cognitivism). To know if a belief is true or false, we have the 
analytic manner – making logical deductions and inferences – which requires 
no reference to lived experience or the synthetic manner – using reference to 
something else that can be experienced in the world. In either way, a tradeoff 
is implied: we can avoid Hume’s guillotine, but only if we cut all paradigms 
other than that comprised of logical propositions out of the language. 
If we maintain that moral statements are a matter of categorical 
imperatives, we will need to go through the guillotine somehow to establish 
the adherence of future or past facts to the pre-given norm. But both 
imperative moods and illocutionary attachments (Searle, 1969) complicate 
attempts to derive new prescriptions from previous ones logically, since 
the statements that belong to those paradigms are not truth-apt and have 
no explicit intentional operators that would allow them to drop properties 
(MATURANO, 2015). One can push the cognitivism envelope and 
start from the propositional content implicit in imperative statements to 
perform logical inferences, but those will lead to logical imperatives that 
will most often lead to paradoxes and puzzles (HANSEN, 2008). One can, 
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alternatively, consider moral prescriptions a matter of attitude or feeling 
rather than fact (Subjectivism), or even as part of a social contract or even a 
matter of persuasion (non-naturalism), in which case the moral properties 
are not to be found in moral language itself.
Figure 1: Key metaethical stances and assumptions (HANSEN, 2008; JOYCE, 
2015; LENMAN, 2014; RIDGE, 2014; VAN ROOJEN, 2015)
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If we believe, like most cyberneticists, that the world is fundamentally 
computational (HAYLES, 2006), in which case logical-mathematical signs 
and relations “transport” (ethical) properties of things, we may very well 
feel able to pre-load computers with ethical information. But if we take the 
ethical agent to be a human-computer hybrid, we need to accept that the 
ethical act will also consistently have at least the possibility of a non-epistemic 
component, be it non-cognitive, non-natural, skeptic, or subjective. Hence, 
either human or computer withdrawal will have an effect in the sensitive 
world. If meaning and feeling are essentially part of the same (often 
ambiguous) material-semiotic process (LEMKE, 2015), could humans co-
evolve with computers by unlearning to make non-cognitive, non-naturalist 
moral meaning? Or should we develop computers that learn to read and 
process human feelings more accurately and take those into consideration 
in their translations of ethical trust into epistemic trust? How can so many 
mistranslations go unpunished in a society that deems itself democratic if 
not because of the illusion that computers have no morals and no politics?
Just as Hume noticed an imperceptible change from “is” to “ought 
to be” in the languaging of the moral philosophers of his time, we are now 
facing a practically imperceptible change from the deontic/directive to the 
probabilistic/veridictive function of the modal operators based on which 
computers work. Put more bluntly, for computers, either things happen as 
they ought to in a probabilistic sense or not; they are “fractures in the fabric 
of being” (FLORIDI, 2009, p.17) that simply do not matter.  But at a time 
when computers are replacing human peers in so many societal routines and 
encounters (KNORR-CETINA, 2001, 2005), the effects of such a clever 
use of modal ambiguity in the sensitive word are probably just as devastating 
ethically as global warming is physically! 
If we wish to begin to understand these new ethical environmental 
processes, entities, and phenomena, and act on them politically, we must, 
somehow, find a better way to deal with cyborg meaning-making ambiguities 
than to hide the authoritarian politics of machines under the modality 
carpet. We must do it, if not for other reasons, because such repressed 
ambiguity will resurface in our ordinary language when we talk about the 
new ethical issues that humans and computers create together.
3 Applied ICT ethics, ambiguity, and alternative approaches
The official field of applied ICT ethics goes by many names: “computer 
ethics” (henceforth CE), “information ethics” (henceforth IE), “computer 
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and information ethics” (henceforth CIE), and “information and computer 
ethics” (henceforth ICE).   Bynun (2005, 2014) attributes the nomenclature 
game to the epistemic impact of Wiener’s (1954) classic “The human use of 
human beings: cybernetics and society.” While IE is basically concerned with 
the management of information, cybernetics, the field founded by Wiener, 
is about information relations in teleological dynamic systems, of which 
computers are just one example. CE is, therefore, “a subfield of Wiener’s 
much broader concerns” (BYNUN, 2014, Item 1).
Wiener (1954) realized that, in describing how dynamical systems in 
equilibrium work, cybernetics provided a certain vision of what a human 
society ought to be. Bridging the is-ought to gap in his own teleological, 
Liberal, post-war, hard-science laden mindset, he believed machines 
should be “used for the benefit of man, for increasing his leisure and 
enriching his spiritual life, rather than merely for profits and the worship 
of the machine as a new brazen calf ” (WIENER, 1954, p.162). Clearly, 
Wiener realized that normative machines had a utilitarian ethical potential; 
however, he approached “cybernethics” (please forgive my pun) from a 
deontological point of view in which law, defined as “ethical control applied 
to communication” (p. 105), should rule human ethical behavior.
Like the computer people in my anecdote, Wiener (1954, p. 105) 
saw language as the transmission of semantic information. Where language 
people usually see the very stuff of society, i.e. discourse and its dynamics 
(LEMKE, 1995), cybernetics sees an impairment to semantic reception. Like 
a missile that needs to reassess the position of its target, for Wiener, a citizen 
needs to “assess his rights and duties in advance” in order to “lead a life free 
from litigation and confusion” (WIENER, 1954, p. 105).  
Provided that clear language is used, Wiener (1954, p. 105-106) 
predicted the (ethical) environmental impacts of automation in society could 
be controlled by four “great principles of justice”: Freedom –  “the liberty of 
each human being to develop in his freedom the full measure of the human 
possibilities embodied in him,” Equality – “what is just for A and B remains 
just when the positions of A and B are interchanged,” Benevolence – “a good 
will between man and man that knows no limits short of those of humanity 
itself,” and Minimum Infringement of Freedom – “What compulsion the very 
existence of the community and the state may demand must be exercised in 
such a way as to produce no unnecessary infringement of freedom.”
As fair as it is to recognize that Wiener could not have predicted the 
current environmental consequences of the cybernetic revolution on a 
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planetary level, to take ethical problems as already known and suitable to 
the pre-existing spirit of the law is an act of faith, more than reason, which 
provides the background to what is now known as the “uniqueness debate” 
in CIE (Bynun, 2014): after all, do computers create new ethical problems 
or do they merely introduce “new instances” of the same old problems?
Manner (1980, n.p., my emphasis) suggested the need for an 
applied ethics to study the problems “aggravated, transformed or created 
by computer technology”. Johnson (1985, p. 1, my emphasis) replied that 
computers “pose new versions of standard moral problems [...] forcing us 
to apply ordinary moral norms in uncharted realms”. Manner’s (1996, p. 
152, my emphasis) rejoinder was that “when we confront unfamiliar ethical 
problems, […] we try to transfer moral intuitions across the bridge [...] [but 
the] lack of an effective analogy forces us to discover new moral values”. 
Johnson (2006) added the additional problem of defining the computer as 
an ethical entity or an ethical agent. For her, to consider computers as moral 
agents is to let their builders/designers/users off the hook. 
Moor (2004, p. 26, emphasis) avoids the uniqueness debate by 
referring to ethical “impacts” rather than ethical “problems”, thus reframing 
the problem of moral agency in terms of distributed human-plus-machine 
activity: computers are  “logically malleable”  machines;  “logic applies 
everywhere “ (Moor, 2004,p.23); therefore, as enablers of moral actions 
(MOOR, 1985, p. 266 as cited in SPINELLO; TAVANI, 2004, p. 18, my 
emphasis) computers “provide us with new capabilities” that  “give us new 
choices for action” so that the limits of computers are “largely the limits of 
our own creativity”. 
To whom do the deictic “us” and “our” refer in these quotations is an 
important question that Moor leaves open, though. In their co-evolutionary 
spiral with artifacts, are humans free to act as they please? Do they only gain 
capabilities or do they also lose skills they used to have? If all possibilities are 
a function of human creativity, why do only some reap the financial profits? 
It is very tempting to include ourselves (me and the reader as computer users) 
in the space opened by “logical flexibility” provided by the Moor’s ambiguous 
pronouns. But does everyone really believe that logic applies everywhere? Is 
anybody free to opt-out before the prophecy self-fulfills?
Technically, Moor (2004) describes the major impact of large-scale 
human-computer activity as “information enrichment”:  elements of social 
practice “come to be conceived as an elaborate computable function among 
people” (MOOR, 2004, p. 23, my emphasis). Just as the passive construction 
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in Moor’s explanation hides a semantic role behind a preposition indicating a 
vague spatial relation, CIE finds itself surrounded by “policy vacuums” (p.23) 
to fill and “conceptual muddles” (p.23) it cannot situate. Perhaps to Wiener’s 
distaste, computers are proving that human laws are inevitably situated and 
languaged. How, then, to conflate heterogeneity and control, if not through 
a net of relations among self-contained objects or ruling systems?  In this 
case Moor knits a net of distributed metaethical stances: an “accommodation 
between reasoned argument and relativity of values is possible” (moral 
relativism) through “rational consideration” (p. 30) (cognitivism) of “our 
fundamental values, based on our common human nature” (deontology): 
“life and happiness” is the end, “ability, freedom, knowledge, resources” 
the means (p. 23) (utilitarianism).  Sometimes all it takes is “empirical 
adjudication” (naturalism), because “disagreements which might appear to 
be about values” (non-cognitivism) “are sometimes merely disagreements 
about facts” (p. 31) (realism). If it’s not a matter of fact, nor of values, it’s a 
matter of chance which can be solved with an elegant theorem (GRANT et 
al., 2010, p. 36): to “assume an impartial position when evaluating policy.” 
Not a bad bricolage at all for computer people. But then there are also the 
information people to deal with, now.
Information Philosophy, a field led by Luciano Floridi (2002), 
reclaims territory from IE that Bynum (2014) says is Wiener’s (1954). 
This possibly explains why Bynun (2014) writes of Floridi’s ICE as FIE 
(Floridi’s Information Ethics) and not ICE, while Floridi writes of CE as 
ICE. According to Wiener, it should be acceptable as long as what is just for 
A and B is just for B and A. But is it?
Floridi (2008) addresses the problem of ICE from an ecological 
perspective, namely by pointing out the environment “in which humanity 
is and will be flourishing” (FLORIDI, 2008, p.3, my emphasis), the 
“infosphere” or:
the whole informational environment constituted by all informational 
entities (thus including informational agents as well), their properties, 
interactions, processes and mutual relations. It is an environment 
comparable to, but different from, cyberspace (which is only one of its 
sub-regions, as it were), since it also includes offline and analogue spaces 
of information. 
This concept comes in the context of Floridi’s (2008) critique of the 
“external model” of mainstream IE (information as resource, product, or 
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target), and, as my emphases suggest, brings it all together into one single 
level of abstraction, where we could speak of region and space, agent and 
property, interaction and relation outside the empirical constraints of 
material-semiotic processes, hardware, and regional dialects. He qualifies 
this strategy as “ontocentric”, and justifies it on the grounds that “there is 
something even more elemental than life, namely being (...) and something 
more fundamental than suffering, namely entropy” (FLORIDI, 2008, p. 12). 
By appealing to the organization of what is as the most fundamental 
value to be considered and calling for a sentience-free environmental ethics, 
Floridi is clearly oversimplifying the real problem, which possibly explains 
why Bynum (2014) isolates his work in an idiosyncratic acronym.  However, 
the notion of infosphere as an ethical environment does seem more attuned 
to what computer-human activity has come to mean today than did Wiener’s 
belief in the realm of human-only law. Thus, the ontology baby needs not 
be thrown away with FIE’s bathwater. What we need is a better approach to 
being, an ontocentric approach that is grounded on the thread of experience, 
like Latour’s (2013), as I will explain in the next section. For now, let’s look 
at Introna’s phenomenological CIE, a second, more politically benign non-
mainstream approach to ICE/CIE.
Inspired by Heidegger’s (1971, p.181, as cited in Introna, 2003, p.7) 
famous claim that the thing “things” world, and in the general Heideggerian 
(1962) notion that technology discloses the human being-in-the-world 
(or dasein), Introna (2014) proposes an applied ICT ethics as a progressive 
“ontological disclosure” of the human trajectory of being-with-technology. 
His conceptual framework borrows from Actor-Network Theory (LATOUR, 
1996) the notion that moral agents are constituted in unfolding relations of 
agencies. From Barad (2003), he brings in the concepts of intra-action, i.e., 
all phenomena are constituted by “dynamic topological reconfigurations/
entanglements/relationalities/ (re)articulations”, and agential cut, i.e., the 
observer gives boundaries to a phenomenon by observing/measuring it 
with an “apparatus” (BARAD, 2003, p. 815). Thus supported, Introna 
(2014) suggests that we must create new discourses and new identities that 
legitimate the ways we intra-act common human values, but that we also 
need to “ask about the constitutive conditions that enable and constrain the 
emergence of those particular agencies as legitimate in the first place” (p. 50). 
This kind of phenomenological approach seems, by far, more attuned 
to a democratic, interdisciplinary applied ICT ethics. However,  the 
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specifications of the intra-actions that generate ethical meanings, along with 
the acceptance of ambiguity as an intrinsic characteristic of cyborg ethics, 
demand that we develop a special kind of apparatus that allows us to disclose 
our own disciplinary ontological limitations reflexively together with the 
material-semiotic deeds that constitute our becoming ourselves over time. 
In short, we need to make agential cuts using an optical apparatus, instead of 
a cutting instrument like Hume’s guillotine. The apparatus I am proposing 
is akin to that used in a double-slit experiment. We want together to see an 
object, but also to become aware of patterns of interference that make us 
see different objects in the same entity, process, or thread of experience. In 
other words, we want to observe the action of beings from different modes 
of existence (LATOUR, 2013).
4 An ambi-optic apparatus to disclose cyborg ethical ambiguity 
The ambi-optic apparatus I propose is based on the question, “how 
language matters”, and is comprised of two different kinds of semiotics: one 
to look at reference itself, the material processes of (ethical) meaning-making, 
from an ecological perspective, namely ecosocial semiotics (henceforth ES); 
the other to look at how technical mediations and disciplinary discourses 
create (ethical) agents and alter matters, namely material semiotics2 
(henceforth MS). Both are anti-Cartesian approaches that have the 
advantages of having been constituted interdisciplinary themselves, and of 
aiming to bridge the sign-thing gap with work, rather than magic.  Although 
they are complementary in certain ways (LEMKE, 2002), ES and MS stem 
from radically different ontological stances: relational wholism (MCGRAIL, 
2008) for the latter and dynamical materialism (BUNGE, 1973) for the 
former. Therefore, the usefulness of bringing them together is not to produce 
unified explanations, but to create an ambi-optic instrument that will force 
the analyst to behold herself in the act of beholding the phenomenon and 
the other. 
2 I use the term “material semiotics” inspired by Law (2006), to encompass Latour’s 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (LATOUR, 1996) and later developments of the same 
approach, especially, Latour’s Inquiry into Modes of Existence (AIME) (LATOUR, 
2013).
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In a nutshell, ecosocial semiotics brings dynamic complex systems 
theory3 as applied to evolutionary biology (SALTHE, 2009) to explain 
the dynamics of ecological environments that include human societies/
communities. Sometimes associated with the field of urban studies, it has 
successfully been combined with social semiotics (Halliday, 1978; Van 
Leeuwen, 2005) in Jay Lemke’s research into ecosocial dynamics (LEMKE, 
1995; 2000) and in Lemke’s further works regarding learning, identity, 
literacy, and multimedia and transmedia communication (LEMKE, 2001, 
2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2009).
In contrast with cybernetics, in ES, the system is not considered 
teleological, and moral considerability is not detached from sentience, as 
feeling and meaning are considered part of the same material-semiotic 
processes (LEMKE, 2015) that happen across scales (from the intra to the 
extracorporeal). ES can accommodate the notion of a cyborg as an ethical 
agent, since it views all entities in a system as epiphenomena of the pertinent 
dynamic processes. Inasmuch as human-computer peers bring together 
machine and human systems of interpretance (LEMKE, 2000, 2015) 
through recurrent patterns of activity, their meaning-making activity can 
be grasped together through the choice of appropriate cogent moments.
ES shares with MS the notion that relations and interactional linkages 
among heterogeneous elements established as material and semiotic processes 
constitute, develop, and change moral acts and moral agencies. Only, 
whereas MS gives us a philosophical account of material reality, ES provides 
a material account of meanings and interactions in a variety levels of reality 
(SALTHE, 2009). Therefore, the possibility of a broader explicit dialog 
between ES and MS is latent and, as a matter of fact, explicit in Lemke’s 
mentions of ANT in his own work (LEMKE 1995, 2001, 2002b, 2015). 
I particularly think that establishing methodological connections between 
Lemke’s (2015) unitary bio-semiotic account of feeling and meaning and 
Latour’s (2013) emphasis on recovering experience in the multiverse could 
be immensely useful in an investigation of sentience, sense, and sensitivity 
in human-computer ecologies.   Enter MS.
I think it is safe to assume that most readers are to some degree familiar 
with Latour’s previous work, broadly known as Actor-Network Theory. In 
3 For a recent account of applications of complex systems theory in the field of language 
studies in Brazil, see Paiva and Nascimento (2011).
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fact, I myself have tried to contribute to a better understanding of ANT 
in the Brazilian applied linguistics community in the past (BUZATO, 
2009,2012a, 2012b, 2013). Therefore, I will focus here on Latour’s more 
recent work, the research project and book entitled “An Inquiry Into Modes 
of Existence” (LATOUR, 2013, henceforth AIME). 
The notion of modes of existence is related to the concept of 
category in metaphysics. Categories represent general kinds that govern 
our conceptual schemes of the real. Each mode of existence is characterized 
by five agentive (rather than substantive) properties: the discontinuities 
it seeks to bridge, the kinds of action it bridges such discontinuities with, 
the necessary conditions for the bridging to hold, the kind of beings such 
continuities institute,  and what kinds of beings-as-otherness (alterations) 
these beings are subjected to. 
Technology (referred to as [TEC] in AIME), is the mode which sets 
up associations of agencies to overcome resistances of the other modes. 
The beings of technology are “delegates” who perform actions on behalf 
of other beings, silently and relentlessly, anticipating/defeating/excluding 
uncertainties. ICTs (as technical infrastructure) can be described as a crossing 
of [TEC] and Double-Click (referred to as [DC], in AIME). [DC] is the 
mode of “free, indisputable, and immediate access to pure, untransformed 
information” (p. 93).   Cultural human meanings, on the other hand, are 
called Reference (or [REF]) in AIME, and it is when [REF] and [DC] cross 
that disputed aboutness, as I have called it, shows. Every cyborg meaning has 
a potential ethical worth that is unable to be manifested as a being of [DC]. I 
can block a social network user who sends me pictures of naked children or I 
can add such a user, but, in both cases, [DC] is simply adding or subtracting 
the pertinent user ID from the vector that represents who I am as a function 
of the unique combination of users I have marked as “friends.” Yet was the 
act about friendship or crime? Pornography or affinity? I could be a pediatric 
dermatologist or a pedophile, how is [DC] supposed to know? Yet [DC] and 
[REF] are involved in either medicine or crime.
When one mode passes through another, they entertain a means-end 
relation, and that relation is what constitutes ethics ([MOR]ality in AIME) 
as a mode of existence. Using the two theories in the same apparatus should 
allow us to pursue both the environmental effects of the passing of material 
reference –  what computer-human peers do together experientially in the 
physical world in their situated sociocultural activities – through [TEC]. 
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[DC], and the new material-semiotic possibilities that become available in 
situated sociocultural practices where humans and computers peer up – how 
the beings sustained by [TEC][DC] materialize in the thread of human-
computer experiences.  
For Latour (2013, p. 455), “if every existent remakes the world in its 
own way and according to its own viewpoint, its supreme value is of course 
that of existing on its own” (p. 455). This, of course, reminds us of Floridi’s 
(2010) attempt at an ontocentric applied ethics, but in Latour’s version, it 
is not about letting everything be: it’s about how each being negotiates its 
means or ends identity in relation to each other. For Latour (2013, p. 461), 
ethics as a mode of existence has no limits, since “everything in the world 
evaluates”. For Lemke (2015), there is an intrinsic evaluative dimension 
to every material-semiotic act, every meaning and feeling process. Could 
we, perhaps, research ways for [DC] to capture human feelings about the 
way [DC] itself works in different human-computer encounters? Should 
we not start worrying seriously about how the [DC] that captures human 
feelings through biometric technologies is and will be used to tailor cyborg 
experiences?
The way AIME qualifies morality speaks directly to reflexivity in each 
disciplinary field and in the interdisciplinary endeavors of the kind I am 
advocating here. A democratic, interdisciplinary, environmentally-oriented 
effort on applied ICT ethics should be open, continuous, and holistic. Hence 
the utility of an ambi-optic apparatus 
5 In conclusion: questions towards a different beginning
I will now return to my anecdote and suggest some examples of 
purposefully broad and vague research questions for interdisciplinary teams 
pursuing a posthumanist/postsocial ethics of here and now. 
First of all, what people in such teams should ask and answer for 
themselves and to others, in a language that is as “ordinary” as possible, and not 
necessarily using AIME’s notation and vocabulary, is what modes of existence 
prevail in their fields and how the modes involved in a given ethical issue relate 
among themselves in terms of means and ends. This will inevitably lead to 
the political dimension of the issue, and require a democratic way of making 
interdisciplinary politics. The key to a successful political agreement that may 
call itself democratic is that users, and not the disciplines of the practitioners, 
are effectively taken as the end and not used as the means.
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In our anecdote, this kind of talk could have led to research into 
biometric identification techniques and letting the computer deal with 
numbers, possibly retrieving information from different governmental 
databases where those are already available instead of using the citizen as 
a repository of numbers from one agency that other agencies can consult. 
It could also have meant researching adaptive interfaces that learned from 
local people’s languaging while informing local educational agents of what 
literacies should be taught at school more often and by what means, as 
well as, among other possibilities, the opportunity to find out how many 
functionally illiterate people there were in each community, what kinds of 
literacies were most necessary, and the providing of this information to local 
education practitioners, for example. 
Finally, a second set of questions inspired in ES should help us see 
the kind of “environmental moral effects” there are when we look at a 
community of cyborg citizens, as human-computer peers’ semiotic activity 
unfolds in time and space across scales. For example, a citizen seeking a 
medical appointment feels “something going on” with cells and chemicals in 
her body that she can only experience as “symptoms.”  A doctor can tell what 
is behind the symptoms through the mediation of “medical inscriptions” that 
depend, in turn, on computer activity.  For the hospital to be paid by the 
government, there must be a “documented case”, which means it must pass 
through a computer, with templates and forms that a clerk, or a patient, or 
both, fill out. Inside all of these computers, there are cybernetic agents doing 
very fast things, unnoticed by users, except when they go wrong, in which 
case they are perceived as defects or bugs.  It takes a doctor to allow people’s 
symptoms to pass through the mode of existence of an “official” disease. It 
takes a computer technician to let the failure of cybernetic agents inside the 
computer become bugs. It takes many other mediations for a biographical 
subject to become a doctor or a computer technician. But the disease only 
exists in the mode that governmental bureaucracy recognizes if there is no 
interruption in the trajectory from symptom to payment, from person 
to doctor or technician, and so forth. Is it fair to consider that the disease 
stopped if the software agent stopped or the process of training or paying 
a doctor or a technician for the community stops? If not, what alterations 
should be available for the disease to be treated as such? How many degrees 
in fever correspond to so many minutes waiting for a computer to reboot, 
an overworked doctor to open the door, a technician to fix a bug? How often 
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does it happen in the community that hospitals get paid for diseases that were 
not there and that patients get worse because a non-human agent was not 
there when necessary? Would it cost less financially and politically to bring 
more human attendants to the community more often or to improve literacy 
education in the community or to deploy a better computer infrastructure 
locally?
These are, obviously, not the only, and possibly not the best, questions 
the apparatus could suggest, but they suffice to illustrate the relevance of 
pursuing such an idea. As put forth in the whole of this essay, I ask the reader 
to look at these elements as an invitation to imagine our ethical future by 
looking at what we are becoming with computers in the here and now.
Acknowledgement
This research was sponsored through grant 2014/25315-7, São Paulo 
Research Foundation (FAPESP)
References
ALEXANDER, Larry; MOORE, Michael. Deontological Ethics. In: ZALTA, 
EDWARD N. (Org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2015 ed. 
[S.l: s.n.], 2015. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/
ethics-deontological/>. Accessed on: March 5, 2016. 
BENTHAM, J.; BURNS, J. H.; HART, H. L. A. A fragment on government. New 
authoritative edition. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
BLACKBURN, Simon. Being good: a short introduction to ethics. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2002. 
BRANDT, R. B. Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language. 
Lawrence: The University of Kansas, 1963, [S.l: s.n.], 1963. 
BUECHNER, J. Trust and Ecological Rationality in a Computing Context. 
SIGCAS Comput. Soc., Milwaukee, WI, v. 43, n. 1, p. 47–68, May 2013. 
Available at: <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2505414.2505419>. Accessed 
on: Sep 13, 2015
BUNGE, M. Method, Model and Matter. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 
1973. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2519-5>. 
Accessed on: December 7, 2015. 
BUZATO, Marcelo E. K. Letramento, novas tecnologias e a Teoria Ator-Rede: 
um convite à pesquisa. Remate de Males, Campinas, v. 29, n. 1, p. 71–87, 2009.
RBLA, Belo Horizonte,  v. 16, n. 3, p. 493-519, 2016 515
BUZATO, Marcelo El Khouri. Letramentos em rede: textos, máquinas, sujeitos e 
saberes em translação. Revista Brasileira de Linguística Aplicada, Belo Horizonte, 
v. 12, n. 4, p. 783–809, 2012a.
BUZATO, Marcelo El Khouri. Práticas de letramento na ótica da Teoria Ator-Rede: 
casos comparados. Calidoscópio, São Leopoldo, v. 10, n. 1, p. 65–82, 2012b.
BUZATO, Marcelo El Khouri. Mapping Flows of Agency in New Literacies: Self and 
Social Structure in a Post-social World. In: JUNQUEIRA, Eduardo S.; BUZATO, 
Marcelo E. K. (Orgs.). New Literacies, New Agencies: a Brazilian perspective. New 
York: Peter Lang, 2013. (New Literacies and Digital Epistemologies).
BYNUM, T. Computer and Information Ethics. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Org.). 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2014 ed. [S.l: s.n.], 
2014. . Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/
ethics-computer/>. Accessed on: September 4, 2015. 
BYNUM, T. Norbert Wiener’s Vision: the Impact of the “Automatic Age” on 
our Moral Lives. In: CAVALIER, R. J. (Org.). The impact of the Internet on 
our moral lives. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. p. 11–25.
FLORIDI, Luciano. Distributed Morality in an Information Society. Science 
and Engineering Ethics, Dordrecht, v. 19, n. 3, p. 727–743, 2013. 
FLORIDI, Luciano. Ethics after the Information Revolution. In: FLORIDI, 
L. (Org.). The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer 
Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. p. 3–19. 
FLORIDI, Luciano. Foundations of Information Ethics. In: HIMMA, K. 
E.; TAVANI, HERMAN T. (Org.). The handbook of information and 
computer ethics. Hoboken: Wiley, 2008. p. 3–24. 
FLORIDI, Luciano. Philosophical conceptions of information. In: SOMMARUGA, 
G. (Org.).  Formal theories of information: from shannon to semantic information 
theory and general concepts of information. Lecture notes in computer science. 
1st ed. Berlin; New York: Springer, 2009. p. 13–53. 
FLORIDI, Luciano. What is  the Philosophy of Information? 
Metaphilosophy, Malden, v. 33, n. 1&2, p. 123–145, January 2002. 
GRANT, S. et al. Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi’s Impartial 
Observer Theorem. Econometrica, Malden v. 78, n. 6, p. 1939–1971, 2010.
GRAY, C. H. (Org.). The cyborg handbook. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
GRAY, C. H. Cyborg citizen: politics in the posthuman age. New York: Routledge, 
2000. 
RBLA, Belo Horizonte,  v. 16, n. 3, p. 493-519, 2016516
HALLIDAY, M. A. K. Language as social semiotic: the social interpretation 
of language and meaning. Baltimore: University Park Press, 1978. 
HANSEN, J. The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: Alive and Kicking. Theoria, 
Malden, v. 72, n. 3, p. 221–232, 11 fev. 2008. 
HAYLES, K. How we became posthuman: virtual bodies in cybernetics, 
literature, and informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
HAYLES, N. K. Unfinished Work: From Cyborg to Cognisphere. Theory, 
Culture & Society, Goldsmiths, v. 23, n. 7-8, p. 159–166, Dec. 1. 2006. 
HAYLES, N. K.. Wrestling with transhumanism. In: GRASSIE, W.; 
HANSELL, G. R. (Org.). H+/-: Transhumanism and Its critics. 
Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011. p. 215–226. 
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and time. London: SCM Press, 1962. 
HEIDEGGER, M. Poetry, language, thought. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 
HURSTHOUSE, R. Virtue Ethics. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Org.). The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2013 ed. [S.l: s.n.], 2013. Available at: <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/>. Accessed on: 
September 4, 2015. 
IHDE, D. Of which human are we post? In: GRASSIE, W.; HANSELL, G. R. 
(Org.). H+/-: Transhumanism and Its critics. Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 
2011. p. 136–146. 
INTRONA, Lucas D. On the ethics of (object) things. Lancaster: Lancaster 
University 2003. Available at: <http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/48689/>. Accessed 
on: November 28, 2015.
INTRONA, L. D. Towards a Post-human Intra-actional Account of 
Sociomaterial Agency (and Morality). In: KROES, P.; VERBEEK, P. P. The 
Moral Status of Technical Artifacts. Dordrecht: Springer, 2014. p. 31–53. 
JOHNSON, D. G. Computer ethics. 1. ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1985. 
JOHNSON, D. G. Computer systems: Moral entities but not moral agents. 
Ethics and Information Technology, Dordrecht, v. 8, n. 4, p. 195–204, 
November 1, 2006. 
JOYCE, Richard. Moral Anti-Realism. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Org.). The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2015 ed. [S.l: s.n.], 2015. 
Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/moral-
anti-realism/>. Accessed on: September 15, 2015. 
RBLA, Belo Horizonte,  v. 16, n. 3, p. 493-519, 2016 517
KING, P. Abelard’s Intentionalist Ethics. The Modern Schoolman, 
Charlottesville, v. 72, n. 2, p. 213–231, 1995.
KNORR-CETINA, K. Sociality with Objects: Social Relations in Postsocial 
Knowledge Societies. Theory, Culture & Society, Goldsmiths, v. 14, n. 4, p. 
1–30, November 1, 1997.
KNORR-CETINA, K.. Post-social Relations: Theorizing Sociality in a Post-social 
Environment. In: RITZER, George; SMART, Barry (Org.). Handbook of Social 
Theory. London: Sage Publications, 2001. p. 521–535.
KNORR-CETINA, K. Postsocial. In: RITZER, G. (Org.). Encyclopedia of social 
theory. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005. v. 2. p. 585–590. 
KRAUT, R.. Aristotle’s Ethics. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. Summer 2014 ed. [S.l: s.n.], 2014. . Available at: <http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-ethics/>. Accessed on: Aug 18, 
2015. 
LATOUR, B.; VENN, C. Morality and Technology: The End of the Means. 
Theory, Culture & Society, Goldsmiths v. 19, n. 5-6, p. 247–260, December 
1, 2002.  
LATOUR, Bruno. On actor-network theory: A few clarifications plus more 
than a few complications. Soziale Welt, v. 47, n.4, p. 369–381, 1996.
LATOUR, B. How to Talk About the Body? the Normative Dimension of 
Science Studies. Body & -Society, Goldsmiths,v. 10, n. 2-3, p. 205–229, June 
1, 2004. 
LATOUR, Bruno. An inquiry into modes of existence: an anthropology 
of the moderns. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013. 
LEMKE, J. L. Textual politics: discourse and social dynamics. London; 
Bristol: Taylor & Francis, 1995. 
LEMKE, J. L. Across the Scales of Time: Artifacts, Activities, and Meanings 
in Ecosocial Systems. Mind, Culture, and Activity, San Diego, v. 7, n. 4, 
p. 273–290, 2000. 
LEMKE, J. L. Discursive Technologies and the Social Organization of 
Meaning. Folia Linguistica, Leuven, v. 35, n. 1-2, p. 79-97, 2001. 
LEMKE, J. L. Travels in hypermodality. Visual Communication, Thousand 
Oaks, v. 1, n. 3, p. 299–325, 2002a. 
RBLA, Belo Horizonte,  v. 16, n. 3, p. 493-519, 2016518
LEMKE, J. Language development and identity: Multiple timescales in 
the social ecology of learning, In: KRAMSCH, Claire J. (Org.). Language 
acquisition and language socialization: ecological perspectives.. London, 
New York: Continuum, p. 68–87, 2002b. 
LEMKE, J. L. Mathematics in the middle: Measure, picture, gesture, sign and 
word. In: ANDERSON, M. (Org.).  Educational perspectives on mathematics 
as semiosis: from thinking to interpreting to knowing. New directions in the 
teaching of mathematics. Brooklyn: Legas, 2003. p. 215–234. 
LEMKE, J. Multimodal genres and transmedia traversals: Social semiotics and 
the political economy of the sign. Semiotica, Berlin, v. 1/4, n. 173, p. 283–297, 
January 2009. 
LEMKE, J. L. Feeling and Meaning: A Unitary Bio-semiotic Account. In: 
TRIFONAS, P. P. (Org.).  International handbook of semiotics. Dordrecht: 
Springer Dordrecht, 2015. p. 589-616. 
LENMAN, J. Moral Naturalism. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Org.). The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2014 ed. [S.l: s.n.], 2014. Available at: <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/naturalism-moral/>. Accessed on: 
September 15, 2015. 
MANER, W. Starter Kit in Computer Ethics. Hyde Park: Helvetia Press and the 
National Information and Resource Center for Teaching Philosophy, 1980.
MANER, W. Unique Ethical Problems in Information Technology. Science 
and Engineering Ethics, Dordrecht , v. 2, n. 2, pp. 137–154, 1996.
MCGRAIL, R. Working with Substance: Actor-Network Theory and 
the Modal Weight of the Material. Techné: Research in Philosophy and 
Technology, Techne, v. 12, n. 1, p. 65-84, 2008.
MOOR, J. H. Reason, Relativity, and Responsibility in Computer Ethics. In: 
SPINELLO, R. A.; TAVANI, H. T. (Org.). Readings in cyberethics. 2nd ed. 
Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2004. p. 21–38. 
MOOR, J. H. What Is Computer Ethics? In: BYNUM, T. (Org.). Computers and 
Ethics. Malden: Blackwell, 1985. p. 266–275. 
PAIVA, V. L. M. O. ; NASCIMENTO, M. (Org.). Sistemas Adaptativos 
Complexo: lingua(gem) e aprendizagem. Campinas: Pontes, 2011. 
RIDGE, M.. Moral Non-Naturalism. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Org.). The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2014 ed. [S.l: s.n.], 2014. . Available at: <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-non-naturalism/>. Accessed 
on: September 15, 2015. 
RBLA, Belo Horizonte,  v. 16, n. 3, p. 493-519, 2016 519
SALTHE, S. N. A Hierarchical Framework for Levels of Reality: 
Understanding Through Representation. Axiomathes, Dordrecht, v. 19, n. 
1, p. 87–99, March 2009.
SALTHE, S. N.; SALTHE, B. M. Ecosystem Moral Considerability: A Reply to 
Cahen. Environmental Ethics, Denton, v. 11, n. 4, p. 355–361, 1989. 
SPINELLO, R. A.; TAVANI, H. T. (Org.). Readings in cyberethics. 2nd ed. 
Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2004. 
STREET, B. V. Literacy in theory and practice. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
THIBAULT, P. J. First-Order Languaging Dynamics and Second-Order 
Language: The Distributed Language View. Ecological Psychology, Hartford, 
v. 23, n. 3, p. 210–245, 2011.
VAN LEEUWEN, T. Introducing social semiotics. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2005. 
VAN ROOJEN, M. Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism. In: ZALTA, 
E. N. (Org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2015 ed. [S.l: 
s.n.], 2015.  Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/
entries/moral-cognitivism/>. Accessed on: October 8, 2015. 
WIENER, N. The human use of human beings: cybernetics and society. 
New York: Da Capo Press, 1954. 
WOLF, A. Giving up Hume’s Guillotine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Hobart, v. 93, n. 1, p. 109–125, January 2, 2015. 
Data de submissão: 10/03/2016. Data de aprovação: 10/06/2016.
